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1. If New Union Department of Natural Resources can
exercise CERCIA natural resource damage trusteeship
over private land under section 107(b)(1) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1988).
2. If Tippecanoe Logging Co. is excused from liability
under the CERCLA section 107(b) act of God defense,
third-party defense, or a combination of both. 42 U.S.C.
9607(b) (1988).
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PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE CASE
This case comes to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Twelfth Circuit on appeal from a decision of the District
Court for the District of New Union upholding the New Union
Department of Natural Resource's exercise of natural re-
source trusteeship over privately owned land which fell vic-
tim to a mining leachate spill and excusing the Tippecanoe
Logging Co. from liability under Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
section 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). All parties concede
that venue in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth Circuit is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988).
BACKGROUND
On September 30, 1989, Tippecanoe Logging Co. (TLC)
sold a parcel of its land, "Site 18," to Mine-Finders, Inc., a
firm specializing in matching new mining sites with compa-
nies that can develop them. New Union v.Tippecanoe Log-
ging Co., Civ. No. 93-2829, slip op. at 2 (D. New Union Apr.
23, 1993). On November 30, 1989, before it went out Of busi-
ness, Mine-Finders sold Site 18 to Tyler-2 Mining (T2M).
Site 18 was transferred in both cases by deed in fee simple
absolute for cash. In each sale the deed included a transfera-
ble right of entry and exit to site 18 on a private road owned
and maintained by TLC. Id.
T2M mines Site 18 using a leaching process to wash
waste rock away from the ore. The highly acidic leachate, in-
cluding chemicals particularly toxic to plant life, ran through
a drainage channel to a surface impoundment. Every forty-
five days, the impoundment was drained and the waste
leachate trucked off-site to a licensed incinerator. T2M holds
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/6
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all required environmental permits under federally-author-
ized programs administered by the New Union Department
of Environmental Protection (NUDEP). Id.
When Mine-Finders sold the mining site to T2M, T2M
inserted a deed provision to win zoning approval from the lo-
cal County Board of Supervisors in which T2M warranted
that it would use an independent contractor approved by the
NUDEP to operate and maintain the surface impoundment.
The same deed provision also required T2M to arrange for an
annual environmental audit by an independent auditing firm
and promptly correct any deficiencies reported. Id. T2M met
these obligations and audits conducted prior to the accident,
in November of 1990 and 1991, found no deficiencies. Id. at
3.
TLC's property is home to the only known population of
the Purple Daisy, a wild flower listed as endangered under
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). The Purple Daisy has a symbiotic relationship with
the Green Swallow. The Green Swallow lays its eggs only in
Purple Daisy leaves and the egg shells left after the Green
Swallows hatch add a key nutrient to the soil in which the
Purple Daisy grows. Though not listed as an endangered spe-
cies, a citizen petition to list the Green Swallow is pending
with the U.S. Department of the Interior. Slip op. at 1, 2.
TLC's property also contains the only known habitat for
the Blue Robin, a bird already listed as endangered under the
Endangered Species Act. Id. at 2. Little is known about its
adaptability to other habitats. Id.
The T2M mining site was inspected by the NUDEP on
April 23, 1992. The NUDEP found no violations and gave the
site it's highest approval rating. Id. at 3. On April 26, 1992,
the area encompassing the T2M site was deluged with the
heaviest rainfall to have occurred during the prior ten years,
just as the impoundment was reaching the end of its forty-
five day filling cycle. A crack developed in the surface im-
poundment wall on the following day, April 27, 1992. In a
matter of fifteen minutes, mining leachate covered the area of
TLC property containing all of the Blue Robin and ninety per-
cent of the Purple Daisy habitat. The parties have stipulated
1994] 691
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that the crack was caused by the heavy volume of liquid held
in the impoundment on April 27. Id.
Within days of the impoundment break, all of the Purple
Daisies in the area affected by the spill had died. The trees
and shrubs in which the Blue Robins nest absorbed leachate
into their root systems and the parties have stipulated that
the trees and shrubs will die within 5 to 8 years. Id.
NUDEP sent an on-site assessment team to the spill site
in May 1992. The team concluded that no response action
was needed beyond its own investigation and recovery for
natural resource damages which are the subject of this law-
suit. NUDEP submitted its bill for $21,000 to TLC and T2M
to recover the expenses of its assessment. T2M paid the bill
in full. Id.
On September 30, 1992, the New Union Department of
Natural Resources, designated as a natural resource trustee
under section 107(f)(2)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(f)(2)(B) (1988), brought suit in the District Court seek-
ing natural resource damages from TLC and T2M under sec-
tions 107(a) and (c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (c)
(1988). Pursuant to CERCLA section 104(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(d)(1) (1988), NUDNR has a memorandum of agree-
ment with the U.S. Department of the Interior authorizing
NUDNR to serve as lead trustee for purposes of litigation and
to represent the interests of both the federal and state trust-
ees. Slip op. at 3. New Union seeks funds to re-propagate
the Purple Daisy in an unaffected state wilderness area and
to study possible alternative habitats for the Blue Robin. Id.
at 4. New Union's public trust doctrine includes riverbeds
and the shores of Lake New Union. In 1979, the Supreme
Court of New Union found that the public trust did not ex-
tend to privately-held lands. Id. New Union's rule regarding
ownership of wildlife follows the common law rule. Id.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Union, in a decision entered April 23, 1993, upheld the au-
thority of the New Union Department of Natural Resources
(NUDNR) to exercise natural resource trusteeship over TLC's
affected land. The court held "that the Endangered Species
Act is evidence of a congressional decision to exert substan-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/6
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tial governmental control over endangered species no matter
where they are located." Id. at 5. Consequently, the New
Union Department of Natural Resources properly exercised
natural resource trusteeship over the resources affected by
the spill. Id.
The court based its decision on sections 107(a) and
101(16) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9601(16) (1988),
and the Department of the Interior (DOI) interpretation that
these sections contemplate the scope of trusteeship authority
to include a basis in common law. Id. (citing Natural Re-
source Damage Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752 (1991) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed Apr. 29, 1991)). The
District Court also found that TLC was not liable for natural
resource damage liability under the "combination defense" of
CERCLA section 107(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(4) (1988).
On appeal, TLC and T2M assert that CERCLA's natural
resource authority is limited to land owned or held by the
government as part of the public trust. The State of New
Union and T2M appeal the district court's decision regarding
TLC's eligibility for act of God and third-party liability de-
fenses under section 107(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)
(1988).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I. CERCLA NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE TRUSTEESHIP
A. Legislative History
TLC and T2M may argue that CERCLA legislative his-
tory supports the exclusion of privately owned property from
New Union's exercise of trusteeship. The State of New Union
may counter that trusteeship of endangered species on pri-
vate property is not specifically precluded by CERCLA. It
may also assert that trusteeship may be exercised because
the Endangered Species Act, which provides for the manage-
ment and protection of endangered wildlife, places in the
state an interest in its endangered species.
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B. Statutory Interpretation
The case of Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880
F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), in which the Department of Inte-
rior (DOI) was ordered to revisit its interpretation of sections
107(f) and 101(16) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9601(16)
(1988), does not provide clear guidance as to when and how
the state can exercise trusteeship over privately owned land.
New Union will argue that the state has been substantially
involved with the private property at issue and it is justified
in its exercise of trusteeship. TLC and T2M may argue that
this interpretation of the statute and regulations would run
afoul of the intent of CERCLA.
C. The Use of Common Law
The New Union Department of Natural Resources might
argue that it can exercise trusteeship based on traditional
doctrines of common law such as the public trust doctrine,
public nuisance cause of action or the parens patriae doc-
trine. TLC and T2M may counter that the traditional use of
these doctrines is limited and that the resources the common
law reaches, such as wildlife, are narrowly defined.
II. COMBINATION DEFENSE
A. Act of God
TLC may argue that the leachate spill was caused by ten-
year record rainfall constituting an act of God under CER-
CLA and therefore they are not liable for any resulting dam-
ages. New Union and T2M may argue that this rainfall was
foreseeable and therefore was not an act of God under CER-
CLA's definition.
B. Third Party Defense
TLC may argue that it has met all the statutory require-
ment s of the third-party defense under CERCLA. TLC may
argue that any contractual relationship it has with T2M is
not connected with the leachate. TLC may also argue that
the breach was unforeseeable and that under the circum-
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stances it exercised due care and took proper precautions
with respect to the leachate.
New Union and T2M may argue that the easement
owned by T2M is a contractual relationship connected with
the waste since trucks drive on it every forty-five days to re-
move the leachate. New Union and T2M may also argue that
there is no evidence in the record of any due care or precau-
tions taken by TLC and therefore their pleading of the third
party defense is statutorily insufficient.
C. Combination Defense
New Union and T2M may argue that every element of
each defense in combination must be proven to satisfy the
statutory requirements of the combination defense. New
Union and T2M may also argue that the legislative purpose
of CERCLA requires this interpretation. TLC may argue
that the lower court was correct in ruling that the combina-
tion defense allows a partial showing of two defenses. TLC
may further argue that requiring a full showing of each indi-
vidual defense under a combination defense would render the
combination defense meaningless.
DISCUSSION
This discussion addresses the two issues on appeal from
the district court. The first issue is the propriety of the exer-
cise of trusteeship over land owned by Tippecanoe Logging
Co. by the New Union Department of Natural Resources
("NUDNR") under section 107(f)(1) of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). The second issue is the liability or excuse from liabil-
ity of Tippecanoe Logging Co. in light of the defenses listed or
a combination of them under CERCLA section 107(b), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
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I. STATE TRUSTEESHIP OF PRIVATELY-OWNED
NATURAL RESOURCES UNDER CERCLA
New Union will argue that the express language of CER-
CLA, as clarified through legislative history and the judicial
interpretation of that language, as well as the recently pro-
posed interpretation of that language by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Interior, supports a holding that the State isintended to be trustee of natural resources under its author-
ity even if privately-held. It will further argue that the facts
of this case are sufficient to establish a trusteeship for New
Union to have standing pursuant to CERCLA. TLC and T2M
will argue that CERCLA language, its legislative history, and
any subsequent interpretations do not support a holding that
the state may exercise trusteeship privately-held natural re-
sources. These parties will further argue that the facts of
this case do not establish that New Union should be consider
a trustee of the natural resources on TLC's land.
A. CERCLA Language
CERCLA expressly establishes the scope of liability for
recovery of natural resource damage to be:
an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources...
liability shall be to the United States government and to
any State for natural resources within the State or belong-ing to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such
State .... Provided, however, That no liability.., shall be
imposed . . . where the party sought to be charged hasdemonstrated that the damages to natural resource com-plained of were specifically identified as an irreversible
and irretrievable commitment of natural resources in an
environmental impact statement, or other comparable en-
vironment analysis, and the decision to grant the permit orlicense authorizes such commitment of natural resources,
and the facility or project was otherwise operating within
the terms of its permit or license ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988).
CERCLA similarly defines natural resources to mean
"land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/6
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water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, man-
aged by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise con-
trolled by the United States . . . , any State or local
government, any foreign government, [or] any Indian tribe
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
New Union will argue that CERCLA language which fol-
lows "belonging to" in both sections indicates Congressional
intent for CERCLA to establish authority for recovery for
harm to natural resources not owned by the government. It
may further argue that, as CERCLA is a remedial statute, its
language must be interpreted broadly. New Union will sup-
port this broader interpretation with the decision in Ohio v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
New Union may also argue that the express exception for pri-
vately-held resources which were determined as "irretriev-
able" in an approved environment impact statement implies
that CERCLA liability was considered for other privately-
held resources.
TLC and T2M will argue that the express language of
CERCLA strictly defines the scope of authority under the
statute and that the words do not extend CERCLA liability to
harm caused to privately-held resources. These parties will
argue that the language explicitly defines natural resources
and the liability for their damage to government ownership
or other limited government property interest, i.e. resources
"appertaining to" government property or resources held by
the government "in trust" for the public.
B. Legislative History
TLC and T2M will argue that CERCLA's legislative his-
tory indicates Congress' intent to exclude privately-held prop-
erty from state trusteeship. New Union will argue that the
legislative history does not manifest an intent to deny the
state authority to recover for privately-held property.
CERCLA is based, with some important modifications,
on three hazardous waste response bills proposed during the
Carter administration. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
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tion, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 1-2 (1982). The Oil Pollution Liability and Compen-
sation Act would have introduced liability and compensation
for oil spill'damages. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). It
was to provide for a trust fund to pay cleanup costs, as well as
damages for injury to real and personal property, natural re-
sources, loss of profits, and loss of tax revenue. Id. §§ 102,
103(a)(2)-(4), 104. Liability was to be joint, several, and
strict. Id. § 104. Also introduced in the House was the Haz-
ardous Waste Containment Act, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980). This bill addressed the regulation of inactive
sites bearing hazardous wastes, other than oil, on land and in
non-navigable waters by a regime of reporting, cleanup and
monitoring. Id. This bill also provided for recovery for injury
to real and personal property, economic loss, and added per-
sonal injury as a category of recovery. Id. § 5. The third of
these proposals was the Environmental Emergency Response
Act. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). It too envisioned
recovery for injury to real and personal property as well as
liability for personal injury. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A). All three bills
were roundly criticized, mainly on the issues of causation of
harm where personal injury claims were permitted, the scope
of liability, and the structure of the fee system to fund the
laws. Grad, supra, at 13-14.
CERCLA finally emerged from amended S. 1480, incor-
porating many of the changes recommended by members of
the Committee on Environment and Public Works. Grad,
supra, at 19-22. The Senate's original purpose in passing
CERCLA was "to I public trust in the Nation's natural re-
sources." S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1984).
Congress was pushed to action on CERCLA by "strong public
demand for action in light of Love Canal and other celebrated
dump sites ... to initiate and establish a comprehensive re-
sponse and financing mechanism to abate and control the
vast problems associated with the abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites." United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 745 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess.
(1980)), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6124). The lan-
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guage of amended S. 1480 was substituted for that of the
House bill, H.R. 7020, and signed into law. Grad, supra, at
35. The compromise bill did not contain joint and several lia-
bility but retained the preexisting common law and statutory
framework. 126 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
The compromise bill also lacked the previous proposals for li-
ability for personal injury and private property loss.
TLC and T2M will argue that Congressional history of
the passage of CERCLA indicate no Congressional intent to
establish liability for injury to privately-held natural re-
sources. These parties will argue that both the Senate and
House rejected bills which would allow recovery for damage
to private property and instead, passed CERCLA following
the removal of language which would permit recovery for
these damages.
New Union will argue the legislative history supports
New Union's authority to exercise trusteeship. It will argue
that although the legislative history does not explicitly au-
thorize the exercise of trusteeship, neither does it explicitly
preclude the exercise if trusteeship. New Union will contend
that CERCLA was intended to be read expansively to effectu-
ate its broad remedial purpose.
C. Judicial Interpretation: Ohio v. United States
Department of Interior
New Union will argue that the holding in Ohio v. United
States Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
permits the establishment of state trusteeship over privately-
held property; the invalidation of the DOI interpretation of
CERCLA natural resources as encompassing governmentally
owned land implies that other state interests may warrant
the establishment of CERCLA natural resource trusteeship.
TLC and T2M will assert that the Ohio precedent did not
enumerate governmental interests which would justify the
establishment of natural resource trusteeship, and that the
interest New Union has in the species here is insufficient to
permit the exercise of such trusteeship.
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In Ohio v. United States Department of Interior, 880 F.2d
432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court examined if CERCLA and the
DOI regulation promulgated on it "invalidly limit the availa-
bility of natural resources damages to cases where the re-
sources harmed . . . are owned by federal, state, local, or
foreign governments, rather than by private parties." Id. at
459. The Ohio court came to no conclusion, reasoning that
the DOI regulations were ambiguous and remanding the reg-
ulation to be clarified by the agency. Id. at 461.
In reviewing CERCLA, the court noted that "the words
[of CERCLA] 'managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to,
or otherwise controlled by' . . . must refer to certain types of
governmental (federal, state or local) interests in privately
owned property." Id. at 460 (citing Barry Breen, CERCLA's
Natural Resource Damage Provisions: What Do We Know So
Far, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,304, 10,305-06
(1984)); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988). However, the court fur-
ther held that the legislative history of CERCLA showed that
"Congress quite deliberately excluded purely private property
from the ambit of the natural resource damage provisions."
Id. at 460.
The court then reviewed the DOI regulation. The court
looked to the preamble of the regulation which stated that
"Congress has defined 'natural resources' with such specific-
ity to leave no doubt that resources owned by parties other
than Federal, State, local or foreign governments (i.e., pri-
vately-owned resources) are not included" and that "section
101(16) clearly indicates that damage to privately-owned nat-
ural resources are not to be included in natural resource dam-
age assessments." Id. at 460-61. The court concluded that
the language of the preamble "[t]aken at face value, . . . ap-
pear[s] to exclude any privately owned property from ambit of
natural resource damage provisions, no matter how heavily
involved a governmental entity may be in managing or other-
wise controlling the property."
Counsel for DOI, however, asserted that the preamble to
its regulation should not be read so strictly and that "a sub-
stantial degree of government regulation, management or
other form of control over the property would be sufficient to
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make the CERCLA natural resource damage provisions ap-
plicable." Id. at 461. As the Court could not ascertain
whether DOI's official interpretation of this CERCLA lan-
guage was that stated in the preamble or that stated by coun-
sel, it remanded the record to DOI to clarify its interpretation
of the scope of these regulations as applied to non-govern-
mental owned lands. Id. New Union will argue that the
Ohio court ruling implicitly grants it the authority to estab-
lish a natural resource trusteeship on TLC's land. New
Union may assert that this decision allowed CERCLA natu-
ral resources to be defined to encompass interests other than
title to the land that the resources are on. TLC and T2M may
counter that, since the Ohio court did not find the DOI coun-
sel's interpretation of 43 C.F.R. part 11 invalid, this court
should adopt the "substantial degree" formulation set forth
by counsel, and that New Union can not meet this threshold.
D. Department of Interior Regulations
New Union will argue DOI's recent proposal to modify its
trusteeship regulation, in response to the Ohio decision, sup-
ports its authority to exercise trusteeship. TLC and T2M will
contend that, as this proposal is not a final ruling, it has no
persuasive authority.
In response to the Ohio decision, which remanded the
relevant DOI regulation for clarification as official agency
policy, DOI proposed a revision to its rule. 56 Fed. Reg.
19,752 (1991). DOI proposed revision would establish as the
official agency policy the interpretation of "managed by, held
in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by, as
these terms appear in CERCLA definition of natural re-
sources, "to ensure a wide range of legitimate government in-
terest in natural resources that may, in fact, be held in
private ownership." Id. The revised policy would be consis-
tent with the DOI argument in Ohio that the regulation in-
tends "general sources of authority for recovery under the
rule [to] include, but not necessarily be limited to,... consti-
tution, statute, common law, regulation, order, deed, or other
conveyance, permit, or ag The revised regulation "directs the
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trustee ... to state briefly the authority for asserting trustee-
ship . . . in the Assessment Plan, and also in the Notice of
Intent to Perform an assessment." Id. On this regulation,
the DOI has not reached a final ruling. Natural Resources
Damage Assessment, Reopening of Comment Period, 58 Fed.
Reg. 39,328 (1993); Natural Resources Damage Assessment,
Extension of Comment Period, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,877 (1993).
New Union will argue that the proposed regulation
should guide the court to uphold its authority to establish
trusteeship over privately-held property. The party will ar-
gue that the proposed regulation reflects DOI's policy and
that the court should defer to the agency, pursuant to Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). New Union may buttress this contention by argu-
ing that the revised regulation merely affirms prior DOI pol-
icy broadly interpreting CERCLA language.
TLC and T2M will argue that the proposed regulation
has no persuasive authority as it is not final agency decision.
These parties may further argue that they may not be held to
the requirements of regulations not yet promulgated. TLC
and T2M may also contend that, for the proposed revised reg-
ulation to govern, New Union must meet its requirements of
notice under the proposed regulation.
E. State Interests
1. Endangered Species Act
New Union may assert a separate basis for natural re-
source trusteeship over the affected species exists from its
power to manage endangered species under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). TLC and T2M may counter that regulation of a spe-
cies does not connote management or control and therefore
the species are not natural resources under CERCLA.
Under ESA, Congress authorized the DOI to protect spe-
cies threatened or endangered with extinction through man-
agement utilizing law enforcement, habitat acquisition and
maintenance, transplantation and other techniques associ-
ated with scientific resource management. 16 U.S.C.
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§ 1532(3) (1988). Whenever a species is listed as threatened
or endangered, the DOI protects the species by issuing regu-
lations necessary to provide for their continued survival. 16
U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988).
CERCLA also recognizes this power of DOI in statutorily
appointing it trustee for natural resources. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(f) (1988). The natural resources entrusted to DOI
under CERCLA include migratory birds and endangered spe-
cies. 40 C.F.R. § 300.600 (1992). For this action, DOI has
agreed that New Union can act on its behalf as a trustee
under both CERCLA and ESA. Slip op. at 3. As an ap-
pointed trustee, New Union is limited to remedial actions
enumerated in CERCLA section 107(f). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f).
These actions include restoration, replacement or acquisition
of the equivalent of the lost natural resource. Id. CERCLA
also authorizes fund expenditures for studies and investiga-
tions of injuries to natural resources, to the extent that such
injury may pose a threat to the public health or welfare or the
environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988). These response ac-
tions should also comply with the standards established by
other environmental laws. 56 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1991) (Army
Corp of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letters).
New Union will argue that, as a designated trustee, it is
given extensive powers to manage the endangered species
within its borders. Furthermore, this management authority
is within the reach of the "managed by, held in trust by, ap-
pertaining to" language which defines a natural resource
under CERCLA section 101(16). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
New Union may further assert that because it is the stated
policy of the ESA to conserve endangered species through sci-
entific resource management until they are no longer endan-
gered, the CERCLA action may incorporate such
management techniques. Although not raised in the lower
court, the NUDNR is also authorized through its trustee title
to commence a remediation action for the green swallow, a
migratory bird. 40 C.F.R. § 300.600.
TLC and T2M may argue that any interest New Union
has in endangered or threatened species, as defined under
ESA, does not bring these species within the ambit of natural
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resources under CERCLA. These parties may argue that reg-
ulation of a species does not connote ownership or manage-
ment of these species and therefore they are not natural
resources controlled by the state under CERCLA.
2. State Interest as Defined by Common Law
New Union may introduce state common law doctrines,
such as ferae naturae and parens patriae, to establish control
or management of the affected area or species in accordance
with the Ohio decision and the proposed DOI regulations.
New Union will argue that alone, or in combination, these
common law doctrines establish that it has an interest suffi-
cient to justify its exercise of a natural resource trusteeship
under CERCLA. TLC and T2M will argue that these com-
mon law concepts do not establish, or do not establish suffi-
cient, control or management by New Union to authorize its
exercise of trusteeship.
As a threshold issue, TLC or T2M may argue that state
common law concepts were preempted by CERCLA. How-
ever, New Union may argue that CERCLA contains a savings
provision which states that "nothing in [CERCLA] shall af-
fect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any
person under other Federal or State law, including common
law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other
pollutants or contaminants." United States v. Colorado, 990
F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d)
(1988)) (footnote omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
a. Public Trust Doctrine
TLC and T2M may argue that there is no basis under
New Union's public trust doctrine to find that the effected
species are within the public trust since New Union's public
trust doctrine doesn't extend to privately held lands. New
Union may counter that it may still hold in trust species on
private lands and in arguendo that the public trust doctrine
of the state should be extended to endangered or threatened
species on private lands.
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The public trust doctrine holds that a government con-
trols some types of natural resources for the benefit of the
public in general. William H. Rodgers, Handbook on Envi-
ronmental Law 171 (1977 & Supp. 1984). It imposes upon the
government an affirmative duty to manage resources in ac-
cordance with the stipulations of the trust. Id. For the doc-
trine to apply, the plaintiff must show the trust was violated,
that is, that there was an "unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of trust rights." Rodgers, supra, at
171. Although traditionally limited to certain kinds of natu-
ral resources, the public trust doctrine has been expanded
through state statutes and court decisions. See National Au-
dubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1986).
States developed the public trust doctrine along different
lines and to include different resources. In New Union, the
public trust includes riverbeds and the shores of Lake New
Union, but not privately held land but not privately held
lands. Slip op. at 4.
TLC and T2M may argue that the public trust doctrine of
New Union does not extend to privately held lands, and
therefore any species on the land owned by TLC are not
within the ambit of the public trust. New Union, however,
may argue that even though the public trust doctrine does
not extend to privately held lands, it may extend to endan-
gered species. New Union may also argue that the public
trust doctrine of the state should encompass endangered and
threatened species.
b. State Ownership of Wildlife: Ferae Naturae
New Union may argue that since it has the power to pro-
tect animals within its borders, the species affected by the
leachate spill are natural resources for the purpose of CER-
CLA trusteeship. TLC and T2M may counter that this inter-
est does not imply that New Union owns or even manages
animals within the state and therefore the species are not
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New Union follows the common law with respect to own-
ership of wildlife. Slip op. at 4. The common law doctrine of
ferae naturae describes wildlife as not owned by anyone until
captured or taken. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805). In 1896, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that wild animals, or ferae naturae, belonged to the citizens
of the state until taken. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979). This concept of state ownership was later rejected by
the Court. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hughes,
441 U.S. 322. In Missouri, the Court did not reject the state's
assertion of ownership over migratory birds, but implied that
the extent of such ownership may be limited." To put claim of
the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed." Id. at
434. The Court later discounted the notion of state owner-
ship of wild animals as legal fiction. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334.
Nevertheless, the Court found that a state has an interest in
protecting and conserving wild animals just as has an inter-
est in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Id. at
337.
In In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va.
1980), decided shortly after Hughes, a district court found
that both the state and federal government possessed an in-
terest in migratory birds. Though the court agreed with the
defendants assertion that the state did not own the birds, it
did find that "the state certainly has a sovereign interest in
preserving wildlife resources." Id. at 40. This interest, cou-
pled with the public trust placed in the State of Virginia and
the federal government, permitted both to recover for dam-
ages to migratory waterfowl caused by an oil spill. Id.
TLC may argue that since New Union does not own the
species affected by the spill, they are not natural resources as
defined under section 101(16) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(16) (1988). Consequently, New Union can not exercise
trusteeship over them. New Union, however, may argue that
its interest in the endangered species affected by the spill is
enough to qualify the species as a natural resource "belonging




New Union may argue that the reach of its authority
under CERCLA can be defined by reference to the public nui-
sance doctrine, since it has authority to act when there is an
"unreasonable interference with the rights common to the
general public." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B
(1979). One court addressing the issue of public nuisance is
the Second Circuit in New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d Cir. 1985), where Shore Realty chal-
lenged the State of New York's authority to seek injunctive
relief under state public nuisance doctrine pendent to a CER-
CLA claim. The Shore Realty court found that "the release or
threat of release of hazardous waste into the environment un-
reasonably infringes upon a public right and thus is a public
nuisance as a matter of New York law." Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1051. Furthermore, the Shore Realty court found
that "the State has standing to bring suit to abate such a nui-
sance 'in its role as guardian of the environment." Id. (citing
State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 978
(Sup. Ct. 1983)). New Union will assert that states have tra-
ditionally had sovereignty over natural resources. Maryland
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972);
Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973); In
re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); Pu-
erto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R.
1978), 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981). New Union will argue that findings that states are
guardians of and have sovereignty over natural resources
under the various state public nuisance doctrines represent
that the state's ability to protect its natural resources is suffi-
cient interest to qualify the Blue Robin and Purple Daisy as
natural resources under the section 101(16) definition of
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
TLC and T2M may argue that although the state may
have the standing to bring a public nuisance claim, such a
claim does not necessarily indicate that New Union also has
the authority to exercise natural resource trusteeship. T2M
and TLC may also argue that the state interest under a pub-
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lic nuisance action is too vague to connote the specific control
interest required by CERCLA's definition of natural re-
sources. Id.
d. The Parens Patriae Doctrine
Under the parens patriae doctrine, a state as "parent of
the nation" or quasi-sovereign and representative of the pub-
lic interest, has standing to protect the air, water, and land
within its territory with or without the consent of affected
landowners. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296 (1921); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Geor-
gia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In order to
have standing as parens patriae, a state must articulate an
interest separate from the interests of private parties and a
substantial portion of its citizens must have been adversely
affected by the challenged acts. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
301 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Haw. 1969).
The State of New Union may represent the citizens of the
state against TLC and T2M to protect their interests in the
natural resources of the state, but it will have to show that a
substantial portion of its citizens have been adversely af-
fected by the challenged acts. The ability to bring a parens
patriae action may provide indication of a state interest suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of trusteeship over Harrison For-
est, or at least that portion which includes the habitat of the
affected species.
F. The "Takings" Issue
TLC and T2M may argue that CERCLA trusteeship ex-
ercised in this manner is unconstitutional taking of property
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. But as
this issue was not raised at trial, it is not in the record and it
is not relevant here. However, TLC and T2M may argue that
Congress did not grant New Union the power to effectuate a
"taking" by establishing a trusteeship over privately-held
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property. New Union may argue that CERCLA is a environ-
mental regulation within the federal and state police powers
and not a "taking" of TLC property.
The Fifth Amendment provides that the federal govern-
ment shall not take private property without compensation,
which also applies to the States through incorporation in the
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
The recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
- U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), affirmed that a "taking"
need not be physical but could be through a regulation or
statute which deprived one of all economic benefit or use of
one's property. Id. at 2895. A "taking" also need not be per-
manent; temporary government interference with the use of
property must be compensated for. United States v. Hardage,
1993 WL 207830, at *1 (10th Cir. June 9, 1993) (holding dis-
trict court's temporary condemnation of third-party plain-
tiff's property pursuant to CERCLA to require compensation)
(unpublished opinion, attached as Appendix A); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987).
As the "taking" claim was not raised before trial, TLC or
T2M may not assert a counterclaim against New Union for
compensation for any alleged taking. However, TLC and
T2M may argue that the lack of any provision for compensa-
tion by CERCLA indicates that Congress did not intend CER-
CLA to authorize the exercise of trusteeship over privately-
held property. These parties may argue the lack of Congres-
sional discussion of "taking" during passage of CERCLA fur-
ther supports a finding that Congress did not contemplate
the establishment of trusteeships over privately-held prop-
erty. To completely support this argument, these parties
must convince the court that the trusteeship would be a "tak-
ing" requiring compensation. As this was not substantively
argued in the court below, it is within the discretion of the
court to accept de novo review of the issue, remand to the
trial court for review of the issue, or preclude the issue.
If the court chooses to entertain this argument, New
Union may counter the "takings" argument by asserting that
the establishment of a trusteeship is not a "taking" as it does
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not deprive TLC or T2M of the full economic benefit or use of
its property as required by Lucas. This party may further
argue that, even if a taking has occurred, the establishment
of a trusteeship remains valid; the Fifth Amendment requires
only that such actions are compensated and TLC and T2M
have never claimed that they are entitled to compensation.
Finally, New Union may argue that the lack of Congressional
discussion of "takings" or language in CERCLA to compen-
sate for "takings" does not preclude that Congress intended to
establish state trusteeships over private property; instead,
CERCLA predates Lucas and CERCLA establishment of
trusteeship was contemplated to have "takings" implications.
II. LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
TLC does not dispute through its appeal the lower court
finding that it was a facility since it owned the land upon
which the hazardous leachate came to be located. TLC will,
however, argue that it is not liable under the combination of
an act of God and an act or omission of third party defenses.
T2M and New Union will argue that both defenses are insuf-
ficient; therefore, TLC is also liable for the costs of any
cleanup and damages.
A. Establishing Liability
CERCLA is addresses action unrecoverable under the
Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act, namely the clean-
up of hazardous wastes already released into the environ-
ment. House Comm. Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 96-510, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. In addi-
tion to establishing a Federal fund to ensure the eventual
clean-up of hazardous waste sites, CERCLA establishes lia-
bility for the "release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
Under Section 107(a) of CERCLA, TLC is classified as
the owner or operator of a facility where hazardous waste is
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/6
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located. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). Section 101(9) of
CERCLA defines a facility as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe
or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, roll-
ing stock or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous waste has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located; not does not in-
clude any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). Since TLC neither disputed nor
appealed this finding this issue is not preserved for appeal.
Section 107(a) defines four distinct categories of potentially
responsible parties (PRPs). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The
other three classes of PRP's, which most likely will not come
up in discussion of the issues relevant to this problem are:
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or for treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances (4) any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs, of a hazardous substance
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)-(4) (1988).
If found liable, TLC will be responsible for all costs of re-
moval incurred by New Union, any necessary response costs
incurred by new Union, any damages for injury to, destruc-
tion of, or loss of natural resources, including the costs of as-
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sessing such damage, and the costs of any health assessment
or health study conducted. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
B. CERCLA Defenses to Liability
TLC raises a combination defense provided by CERCLA
incorporation an act of God and the third party defense pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). TLC will argue that
through this combination of defenses it is not liable for the
release of leachate from T2M's land. T2M and New Union
will argue that the defenses presented by TLC are statutorily
insufficient and not satisfactory to overcome the burden im-
posed by the legislative intent of CERCLA.
CERCLA provides only four defenses to limit a PRP's lia-
bility. Section 107(b) of CERCLA provides that a party shall
not be liable under section 107(a) when the release of a haz-
ardous substance is "caused solely by - (1) an act of god; (2) an
act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party ... or (4) any
combination of the foregoing." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). To
further the statutory purposes of CERCLA to encompass all
instances of hazardous waste release, courts have interpreted
these defenses narrowly. Kelly v. Thomas, 757 F. Supp. 1532,
1540 (W.D. Mich 1989), New York v. Shore Realty 759 F.2d
1032, 1045 (2nd Cir. 1985).
1. Act of God Defense
TLC will argue that the record ten year rainfall which
caused an increased volume behind the impoundment wall
resulting in the break was an act of God under CERCLA.
T2M and New Union will argue that this rainfall was a fore-
seeable climatic event and therefore not an act of God. All
parties may refer to act of God cases occurring under section
311 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988), whose wording




a. Common Law Origins of the Act of God
Defense
The Act of God defense originated at common law in
cases involving dams and impoundments of water. This de-
fense allowed an individual to avoid liability for property
damage caused by a break in an impoundment. These "acts
of God" have been limited to only unforeseeable natural di-
sasters, floods and the like. Under common law, the elements
of this defense are established by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence that the rainfall, runoff, or flooding (1) were unprece-
dented and extraordinary; (2) could not have been reasonably
anticipated; (3) could not have been reasonably provided
against; and (4) were the sole proximate cause of the damage
to plaintiff's property." Woonenberq v. Boone Township, 455
N.W.2d 832, 835 (N.D. 1990). Thus, floods of a phenomenal
nature do not have to be guarded against but "extraordinary
rainfalls occasionally occurring" should be anticipated
against and may not be used as a defense. Cortell v. Mar-
shall Infirmary, 24 N.Y.S. 381 (1893).
The principle, clearly, is that, although rainfall may be
more than ordinary, yet if it such as has occasionally oc-
curred, and it may be at irregular intervals, it is to be fore-
seen that it will occur again, and it is the duty of those
changing or restraining the flow of water to provide
against the consequences that will result from it.
Eikland v. Casey, 266 F. 821 (9th Cir. 1920) (quoting Ohio &
M. Ry. v. Ramey, 28 N.E. 1087 (Ill. 1891)). Under this test,
only unpredictable and unforeseeable heavy rainfall would
constitute an act of God. However, courts have refused to go
beyond the legislative intent of Congress to define an act of
God under environmental statutes. Sabine Towing v. United
States, 666 F.2d 561 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Consequently, this com-
mon law has not been used as authority by courts in inter-
preting the act of God defense in the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Instead courts are limited to the congressional intent and leg-
islative history of the statute. Id.
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b. Clean Water Act
CERCLA was passed in 1980 to make compensable
claims that could not be satisfied-under provisions of section
311 of the Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1321, (1988), for re-
leases of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(1)
(1988). This section is therefore a useful reference in deter-
mining the scope of available defenses under CERCLA. Lin-
coln Properties v.Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (E.D. Cal.
1992). As in section 107(b) of CERCLA, section 311 of the
Clean Water Act limits the defenses for a release to an act of
God, an act of war, an act or omission of third party, or any
combination of the three. This section defines an act of God
as "an act occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural dis-
aster." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(4) (1988). The Conference Report
of the Clean Water Act further clarifies this definition. The
report states that:
[t]he term 'act of God' is defined to mean an act occasioned
by unanticipated grave natural disaster. This definition
varies from the Senate definition, and under this defini-
tion, only those acts about which the owner could have had
no foreknowledge, could have made no plans to avoid, or
could not predict would be included. Thus, grave natural
disasters which could not have been anticipated in the de-
sign, location, or operation of the facility or vessel by rea-
son of historic, geographic, or climatic circumstances, or
phenomena would be outside the scope of the owner's or
operator's responsibility.
Conf. Rep. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2722. Courts have gone no further than
this definition to define what constitutes an act of God. Con-
sequently, earlier common law interpreting the act of God de-
fense has not been looked to for clarification of what
constitutes an act of God. Sabine Towing v. United States,
666 F.2d 561 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Given the narrowness of this de-
fense in a strict liability scheme, judges have typically fo-
cused upon the foreseeability of the natural event. United
States v. West of England Ship Owner's Mut. Protection & In-
dem. Assoc., 872 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1989). For instance, a
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thunderstorm of which weather forecasters warned only one-
half hour before the storm passed over a vessel was not an act
of God under this section. Liberian Polar Transps. v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 223 (1992). In addition, spring runoff caus-
ing flooding does not constitute an act of God under the Clean
Water Act. Sabine Towing, 666 F.2d at 564.
c. CERCLA definition
CERCLA defines an "act of God" similarly to the Clean
Water Act as an "unanticipated grave natural disaster or
other phenomena of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresisti-
ble character, the effects of which could not have been pre-
vented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(1) (1988).
In United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D.
Cal.), related case 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986), the court
found that heavy rains were not an act of God under CER-
CIA. In that case, heavy rains on several occasions caused
acid pits at the site to overflow, causing a release of contami-
nated water into a nearby community. The Federal District
Court of Central District of California ruled that
the rains were not the kind of 'exceptional' natural phe-
nomena to which the narrow act of God defense of section
107(b)(1) applies. The rains were foreseeable based on nor-
mal climatic conditions and any harm caused by the rain
could have been prevented through the design of proper
drainage channels.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061. Thus, the record rainfall
involved here will only be found to be an act of God if it is
unanticipated, of exceptional character, and the effects of the
rainfall could not have been avoided through due care and
foresight.
TLC may argue that the record ten year rainfall could
not have been foreseen, and furthermore that the effects of
this rain in causing the breach in the impoundment wall
could not have been avoided since this consequence was also
unforeseeable. New Union and T2M will argue that the rain-
7151994]
33
716 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
fall here, like U.S. v. Stringfellow, was predictable. There-
fore, the act of God defense is not available to TLC.
2. Act of War
Although not at issue here, it is worth noting that at
least one court has interpreted the act of war defense under
CERCLA. An act of war is not defined in either CERCLA or
the Clean Water Act but by implication it is "an act of a com-
bative nature." United States v. Shell Oil Co., 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,791, 20,792 (C.D. Cal. 1992). Thus, a
contract with the Department of Defense and a wartime scar-
city of resources to build disposal facilities during World War
II, did not constitute an 'act of war' under CERCLA. Id.
3. Third Party Defense
TLC will argue that since the release was from T2M' s
land and not caused by TLC, it is not liable for this release.
TLC may further argue that it satisfies the statutory ele-
ments of this defense since it has no contractual relationship
with T2M and it could take no acts against an unforeseeable
release of leachate. New Union and T2M will argue that TLC
has not satisfied all the elements of this defense. T2M and
New Union will further argue that since T2M and TLC have
a contractual relationship, an easement, the third party de-
fense is not available.
Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA establishes that no liability
will be found if the release was solely caused by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a pub-
lished tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common car-
rier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
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light of all the relevant facts and circumstances,
and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the conse-
quences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
Applying the 107(b) third party defense to the present
case, TLC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that: a) an act or omission of T2M was the sole cause of the
release; b) the act or omission did not occur in connection
within a direct or indirect relationship with T2M; c) it exer-
cised due care with respect to the leachate; and d) it took pre-
cautions against any foreseeable acts or omissions of T2M
and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or omissions.
See United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp.
742, 748 (W.D. Mich 1987); Kelly v. Thomas, 714 F. Supp.
1439, 1446 (W.D. Mich 1989); United States v. A & N Clean-
ers, 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A defendant's
mere assertion that he had "no control over the third party"
without statement of the elements of the third party defense
is statutorily insufficient and therefore barred. United States
v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
a. In Connection with a Contractual Relationship
Any claim by New Union and T2M that T2M and TLC
have a contractual relationship will be based upon T2M' s
ownership of a "transferable right of entry and exit" across
land owned by TLC. New Union, slip op. at 2. This "transfer-
able right of entry or exit" included with the deed is appar-
ently an easement.
CERCLA defines "contractual relationship" as including
"but not limited to land contracts, deed or other instrument
transferring title or possession." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (a)
(1988). This definition was added to CERCLA in 1986 by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), and has been found
to include leases. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d
7171994]
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1032 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. Monsanto, 858 F. 2d
160 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Argent, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,497 (D.N.M. 1984). The legislative history
of CERCLA implies a broad reading of an indirect contractual
relationship. 26 Cong. Rec. 26,783 (1980) (remarks of Sen.
Gore). However, courts have narrowly construed the require-
ment that the contractual relationship occur "in connection
with" the act or omission of the third party, thus limiting the
scope of an indirect contractual relationship. This require-
ment does not encompass "all acts by a third party with any
contractual relationship with the defendant. Such a con-
struction would render the language 'in connection with'
mere surplusage." Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 743 F. Supp.
268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Dis-
trib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1992), the plaintiff sued the
defendant for cleanup costs of a site it had acquired from the
defendant's predecessor. The defendant conceded that the
sale of the land was a contractual relationship but argued
that the sale had no connection with the waste involved. In
an appeal from a summary judgment motion by the plaintiff,
the court refused to rule that National Fuel could not assert
this defense. The court required that a party opposing the
defense, show more than a "mere existence of a contractual
relationship." Id. at 89. This contractual relationship "must
either relate to the hazardous substance or allow the land-
owner to exert some control over the third party's activities."
Id.
In the present case, T2M possesses a transferable right
of entry and exit on access road #5 that is owned and main-
tained by TLC. This right of entry was purchased at the
same time as Site 18 from a third party, Mine Finders, who
purchased it from TLC. New Union, slip op. at 2. It is the
only access to the site. Id. TLC may argue that this is not a
direct or indirect contractual relationship. TLC may also ar-
gue that even if it is a contractual relationship, the transfera-
ble right of entry and exit has no relation to the leachate.
The State of New Union and T2M may argue that the trans-
ferable right of entry is a "land contract" under the definition
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of contractual relationship. Furthermore, since the road is
necessary for T2M to operate its mine and the leachate is pre-
sumably removed via this road, the contract and the leachate
are related.
b. Due Care/Precautions Requirement
Another requirement of the third party defense is that
TLC had to exercise due care with respect to the leachate.
TLC will argue that it did not have to take measures against
a possible release of leachate from T2M's mining operation
since such a release was unforeseeable. T2M and New Union
will argue that TLC has presented no factual evidence to the
court that it took any measures in anticipation of a possible
release of the leachate from T2M's property. Therefore, TLC
has not properly pled this defense and is liable under CER-
CLA section 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York interpreted this element to require that a PRP possess
knowledge of the waste. United States v. A & N Cleaners and
Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In that
case, A & N Launderers, subtenants of a property owned by
another defendant, were found to have contaminated a local
aquifer. The contamination had spread from chemicals
dumped into a drain on the property that emptied into a dry
well. The owner of the property raised the third party de-
fense under CERCLA section 107(b)(3). The court first found
that no contractual relationship, direct or indirect, existed be-
tween the lessor and a sublessee for the purpose of this de-
fense. This ruling was based on a common law finding that
no privity of contract existed between a lessor and a subles-
see. In discussing the due care/precautions requirement, the
court held that:
[t]he due care/precautions requirement clearly contem-
plates some degree of awareness by the defendant of the
potential for a release of a hazardous substance: it is hard
to fathom how a defendant could take due care "taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous sub-
stance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances," or
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take precautions against "foreseeable acts or omissions of
any third party" if it is unaware that any hazardous sub-
stance is being used or disposed of.
Id. at 1329. The court found that the property owners should
have been aware of the activities because of investigative ac-
tivities at the site. These activities included the town's re-
quest of permission to drill bore holes for testing purposes.
The court however could not conclude, based on the record,
what the landowner should have done to exercise due care.
In United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988), a landowner leased land to a company which subse-
quently stored hazardous waste in barrels on the property.
The barrels leaked and the waste seeped into the ground.
The court rejected the landowner's third party defense be-
cause it could not establish the absence of an indirect or di-
rect relationship and it presented no evidence that it took
precautionary measures against foreseeable conduct of the
defendant.
4. Combination of Act of God and Third Party Defense
TLC will argue that the court should uphold the lower
court's finding that "partial or marginal showings of some in-
dividual defenses can culminate to a solid combination de-
fense under 107(b)(4)." New Union, slip op. at 6. New Union
and T2M will argue that CERCLA's legislative history and
Congressional intent implies a broad reading of the defenses
and therefore marginal defenses under a combination defense
are not adequate.
CERCLA section 107(b)(4) allows for a defense based on
a combination "of the foregoing paragraphs" which are the
three other enumerated defenses: an act of God; an act of
War; or the third-party defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(4)
(1988). Since no cases directly interpret this defense, the ar-
guments of the parties for and against this defense will be
based on statutory interpretation. TLC raised the combina-
tion defense of an act of God and an act or omission of a third
party. Courts have avoided reference to the combination de-
fense to the extent that some cases make no mention of it
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when discussing CERCLA defenses. United States v. Mon-
santo, 858 F.2d at 160; Lincoln Properties, 828 F. Supp. at
1539 ("An otherwise liable party may avoid CERCLA liability
only by establishing one of the three affirmative defenses set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)").
The statutory language that most likely will be at inter-
preting the combination defense will be the phrase "caused
solely by". Under CERCLA liability is imposed unless the re-
lease or threat of release was caused solely by an act of God,
an act of War, an act or omission of a third party, or any com-
bination of the foregoing. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). TLC
may argue that the phrase "caused solely by" does not extend
to each element of a combination defense and therefore a
marginal showing of two or more defenses is statutorily suffi-
cient. New Union and T2M, however, may argue that "solely
caused by" does extend to each defense in the combination
and therefore each must be able to stand alone.
Several rules of statutory construction apply in inter-
preting this defense. First, unless a statute's language is am-
biguous, courts are restricted to its literal meaning.
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982). How-
ever, any literal interpretation should be viewed in light of
the legislative intent or purpose which is to "prevent the po-
tentially devastating effects of introducing hazardous sub-
stances into the environment." United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Skelly
Oil v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okla. 1966). Fur-
thermore, courts must give effect to every word in a statute.
Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983).
New Union may argue that the combination defense still
requires that all of the elements for any individual defense
must be proven. Therefore, if a party cannot prove that it
took due care in the handling of a hazardous waste or that
there was an act of war, that party should not prevail when
raising a combination defense of an act or omission of a third
party and an act of war.
TLC and T2M may argue that the lower court was cor-
rect in holding that the combination defense can be satisfied
by only a marginal or partial showing of other defenses. TLC
1994]
39
722 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
and T2M may also argue that a combination defense does not
require that each part of the defense should be able to stand
alone. TLC and T2M may further argue that such a require-
ment would be redundant.
III. EQUITABLE DEFENSES
Since none of the parties raised the question of equitable
defenses, it is not an issue before this court. It is worth men-
tioning, however, that a few U.S. District Courts have al-
lowed equitable defenses in CERCLA contribution actions.
These decisions are based on the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). In that
case, the court held that the CWA did not bar equitable dis-
cretion of the courts in considering injunctive relief. The
Court ruled that "unless a statute in so many words, or by
necessary and inescapable inference restricts the Court's ju-
risdiction in equity, the full scope of jurisdiction is to be rec-
ognized and applied." Id. at 313.
After its passage, several courts found that since CER-
CLA actions sought restitution, an equitable remedy, equita-
ble defenses should be available. These defenses included
laches and unclean hands. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283
(D.R.I. 1986), overruled by United States v. Davis, 794 F.
Supp. 67 (D.R.I. 1992); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music. Ltd.,
600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). However, these decisions are
criticized as ignoring the express language of section 107 of
CERCLA. This section, in relevant part, states that liability
is imposed "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b)
of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
A majority of jurisdictions do not allow equitable de-
fenses to be raised in section 107(b) actions. Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d. 86 (3d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1988); Kelly v. Thomas Solvent
Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich.1989); United States v.
Vineland Chem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1988); Chemi-
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cal Waste Management Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669
F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow,
661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987). "While it may be logical
to permit equitable defenses in an inherently equitable pro-
ceeding and sections 106 and 113 both permit equitable con-
siderations, the clear answer for section 107 is that Congress
explicitly limited the defenses to only those three provided in
section 107(b)." United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397,
427 (D.N.J. 1991).
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For a brief summary of the arguments refer to Summary
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